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I. INTRODUCTION
In the interest of national security, travelers are often required to
endure some degree of inconvenience, delay, and invasion of personal
privacy. Prior to boarding any commercial flight, for example, individuals
are frequently asked to comply with certain rules and undergo security
screenings. 1 Many of us have experienced passing through airport security
where a stoic TSA agent asked us to remove our shoes, place our personal
belongings on a conveyor belt to be screened, and walk through the metal
detectors. 2 These policies and procedures are even stricter in the context
of international travel—all travelers are subject to examination and search
by Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 3 While it can certainly feel
burdensome, most travelers understand that heightened security measures
at the airport are a small price to pay for a safer America, especially in
light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 4 But at what point does
mere inconvenience become a significant invasion of privacy that
travelers no longer anticipate?
The Fourth Amendment guarantees to American citizens a
constitutional right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 5 It is important to
note that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and
seizures—only those which are unreasonable violate the U.S.

* Marissa Pursel is a J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Akron School of Law. Many thanks to
Randolph Baxter Professor of Law Martin Belsky for his expertise and thoughtful guidance in the
writing of this article, and to the entire Akron Law Review staff. Thank you as well to my family and
friends who have patiently supported me throughout the writing process.
1. At the airport, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screens travelers’ carryon bags for “explosives and other dangerous items.” TSA workers also request that travelers remove
their larger electronic devices such as laptops from their carry-on bags for x-ray screening. Under
certain circumstances, travelers may be required to undergo a pat-down search. Security Screening,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening
[https://perma.cc/73S7-QALE].
2. Id.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROTECTION,
3. CBP
Search
Authority,
U.S.
https://www.cbp.gov/travel/cbp-search-authority [https://perma.cc/42KS-RQVL].
4. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. has placed greater focus on national security and
law enforcement in an effort to “apprehend potential perpetrators and prevent future tragedies.” John
M. Allen, Note, Expanding Law Enforcement Discretion: How the Supreme Court’s Post-September
11th Decisions Reflect Necessary Prudence, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 587, 590 (2008).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Constitution. 6 Generally, a “reasonable” search is one that is conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued upon a finding of probable cause. 7 Thus,
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” 8 For example, the government may conduct a
warrantless search where an individual is lawfully arrested, 9 voluntarily
consents to the search, 10 or seeks entry to or exit from the United States. 11
Where a search is conducted at the border rather than within the
United States, the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement is
quite different. 12 Pursuant to the border search exception, the government
may search travelers and their belongings at the border without showing
probable cause and without first obtaining a warrant. 13 As a general rule,
searches at the border do not even require reasonable suspicion, provided
the search is “routine.” 14 The rationale for the border search exception
rests on the government’s interest in national security, and searches at the
border are deemed reasonable “simply by virtue of the fact that they occur
at the border.” 15
Electronic devices have created uncertainty in the context of the
border search doctrine. 16 In determining whether searches of electronic
devices at the border require any degree of particularized suspicion, courts
have begun to consider whether a distinction should be made between
various types of travelers’ property. 17 Arguably, a meaningful distinction
should be made between classes of property subject to search at the
6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
7. Benjamin J. Rankin, Note, Restoring Privacy at the Border: Extending the Reasonable
Suspicion Standard for Laptop Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301, 301 (2011).
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
9. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
10. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
11. Jon Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 354–55 (2005).
12. Id. at 355 (noting that “in view of Congress’ power to regulate international commerce, the
Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border
than in the interior.”).
13. Sunil Bector, ”Your Laptop, Please:” The Search & Seizure of Electronic Devices at the
United States Border, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 695, 697 (2009).
14. Adams, supra note 11, at 354.
15. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
16. Thomas Mann Miller, Comment, Digital Border Searches After Riley v. California, 90
WASH. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (2015) (arguing that federal courts have had the “difficult task” of
determining how the Supreme Court’s decisions in the area of border searches, which thus far have
only addressed searches of persons and items of tangible property, should be applied to searches of
electronic devices).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Kolsuz,
890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
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border; electronic devices, which contain a vast amount of sensitive
personal information, are fundamentally and substantively distinguishable
from the ordinary luggage traditionally subject to manual search. 18 While
it is well established that the federal government has “plenary authority”
to conduct “routine” searches at the border without a showing of any
particularized suspicion, 19 forensic searches of electronic devices should
be subject to a higher standard. 20
A pair of 2018 decisions in the Circuit Courts, decided only 14 days
apart, highlight the issue of forensic searches of electronic devices at the
national border. 21 In Kolsuz, a traveler was detained at an international
airport after border agents found firearm parts in his luggage, which
Kolsuz lacked the appropriate license to transport. 22 The agents
confiscated Kolsuz’s smartphone and conducted an extensive forensic
examination, extracting almost 900 pages of digital information. 23 The
Fourth Circuit found the off-site forensic search to be nonroutine, but this
finding was not outcome-determinative—the evidence was properly
admitted upon a finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to
perform the search. 24
Two weeks later, the Eleventh Circuit refused to recognize any
distinction between searches of electronic devices and the traditional
routine searches conducted at the border, finding forensic searches
themselves to be routine. 25 In Touset, a traveler suspected of possessing
and distributing child pornography was stopped at an international airport
where border agents confiscated his cell phones, camera, tablets, and
external hard drives. 26 Forensic searches were performed on several
18. Tom Rechtin, Back to the Future of Your Laptop: How Backlash over Prolonged Detention
of Digital Devices in Border Searches is Symptomatic of a Need for “Reasonable Suspicion” in All
Border Searches of Digital Devices, 7 IDAHO CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 65, 87 (2014) (suggesting
that “it would be inappropriate to apply a set standard for all property” because “not all pieces of
personal property possess the same kind of relation to the person who owns them.”).
19. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985).
20. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (holding that reasonable suspicion should be required for
forensic searches of computers, recognizing “the uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic
devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus renders an exhaustive exploratory
search more intrusive than with other forms of property.”). More recently, the Fourth Circuit found a
forensic search of a traveler’s electronic device to be “nonroutine” and “permissible only on a showing
of individualized suspicion.” See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144.
21. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Touset, 890
F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
22. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 136.
23. Id. at 139.
24. Id. at 136–37.
25. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
26. Id. at 1230.
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devices, revealing child pornography. 27 Although the Eleventh Circuit
held that no reasonable suspicion was required to conduct the forensic
search, this finding was not outcome-determinative as customs agents had
reasonable suspicion prior to the search. 28
Forensic searches are unique—digital devices are capable of housing
exponentially more information than a suitcase could ever hold. 29
Moreover, electronic devices contain a user’s “sensitive and confidential
information,” 30 which is stored in a single, convenient location for
examination. 31 The nature and quantity of information capable of being
stored on an electronic device supports the proposition that law
enforcement wishing to conduct a forensic search at the border should not
be permitted to do so without some degree of particularized suspicion. 32
Either the Supreme Court or the legislature must speak on this issue in the
near future to ensure that such invasive searches are only conducted when
truly necessary in the interest of national security. 33
This Note begins by exploring the current CBP policy surrounding
the border search exception as it relates to electronic devices. Section II
addresses the border search exception, the general requirements for

27. Id.
28. Id. at 1231.
29. See Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 145 (recognizing that “the sheer quantity of data stored on
smartphones and other digital devices dwarfs the amount of personal information that can be carried
over a border—and thus subjected to a routine border search—in luggage or a car.”).
30. “[E]lectronic devices often retain sensitive and confidential information far beyond the
perceived point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing histories and records of deleted files.”
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013).
31. Laura K. Donohue, Customs, Immigration, and Rights: Constitutional Limits on Electronic
Border Searches, 128 YALE L.J.F. 961, 965–966 (2019) (noting searches of modern cell phones reveal
“[f]ar more information than law enforcement would be able to obtain by executing a physical
warrant.”). Donohue provides a helpful example by comparing the search of a home to the search of
a cell phone. Where law enforcement obtains a warrant to search a home, the search is limited to what
is described in the warrant. The search of a cell phone, however, reveals vastly more information
about the individual, including personal contacts, photographs, videos, GPS records, and more.
Donohue explains: “It is the equivalent of looking not just at an individual’s home, but entering their
bank, their car, and their workplace; accompanying them on dates and on social occasions; going to
the PTA meeting with them, or to their local grocery store or mall; attending their places of worship;
and sitting down next to them at the public library to make a record of everything they read.” Id. at
965.
32. Rechtin, supra note 18, at 85–87 (arguing that despite the federal courts’ articulated
“suspicionless” standard for searches of electronic devices at the border, a “reasonable suspicion”
standard should apply to these searches).
33. Will Carroll, “Please Unlock Your Phone”: Why Reasonable Suspicion Should be
Extended to Cursory Searches of Electronic Devices at the Border, 107 KY. L.J.O. 1, 13 (2018)
(arguing that legislative action would be the most effective means to implement a requirement for
reasonable suspicion for searches of electronic devices at the border, but that initiative by federal
courts would directly influence changes in CBP’s policies).
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searches under the Fourth Amendment, the distinction between routine
and nonroutine searches, and the unique circumstances created by the
emergence of electronic devices such as laptops and smartphones in
everyday life. Section III addresses the circuit split between the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits as to the standard to be applied when border agents
wish to forensically search electronic devices at the border. Section IV
advocates for a requirement of, at minimum, reasonable suspicion.
Section V concludes.
II. FORENSIC SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES AT THE BORDER
The search of electronic devices at the border is undertaken by CBP,
which has issued several directives addressing the ability of customs
agents to search, copy, and share digital information stored in a traveler’s
electronic device. 34 The most recent CBP directive, issued in January
2018, defines “electronic device” as “any device that may contain
information in an electronic or digital form, such as computers, tablets,
disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other communication devices,
cameras, music, and other media players.” 35 Searches of such devices are
justified because they help federal agents to discover “evidence relating
to terrorism and other national security matters, human and bulk cash
smuggling, contraband, and child pornography.” 36
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), more
than 397 million international travelers were processed by CBP officers
during the 2017 fiscal year. 37 Of these incoming travelers, only 29,200
(approximately 0.007%) were subjected to a search of their electronic
devices. 38 This is an increase from the 0.005% of international travelers
subjected to searches of their electronic devices in 2016. 39 According to
this data, few travelers are actually subjected to searches of their devices
at the border. However, it is not the number of actual searches that should
strike fear into any individual planning to travel internationally; it is the
practically unrestricted ability of CBP to search every device that crosses
the border. Thus, every traveler that crosses the border with an electronic
34. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2018).
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id. at 1.
37. CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device Directive and FY17 Statistics,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-mediarelease/cbp-releases-updated-border-search-electronic-device-directive-and [https://perma.cc/X4G9NTFZ].
38. Id.
39. Id.
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device (a smartphone, computer, tablet, etc.) is affected by the current
policy.
While CBP has broad authority to conduct searches at the border in
the interest of national security, as a policy matter, DHS has imposed
certain requirements of their own “to ensure that the authority for border
search of electronic devices is exercised judiciously, responsibly, and
consistent with the public trust.” 40 Pursuant to the most recent directive, a
CBP officer may perform an “advanced” search of an electronic device
where “there is reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws
enforced or administered by CBP, or in which there is a national security
concern, and with supervisory approval at the Grade 14 level or higher.” 41
In earlier cases involving the search of electronic devices (primarily
laptops) at the border, customs agents performed a manual search of the
device, “clicking through the desktop, media folders, and internet history
to identify evidence of illegal activity.” 42 More recently, however, CBP
agents have begun conducting forensic searches, which are by all
measures significantly more intrusive with respect to the traveler’s
privacy. 43
Forensically searching a traveler’s electronic device involves more
than merely thumbing through an individual’s photos or contacts. 44
Computer forensics is a field encompassing the “methodologies used to
collect, preserve, and examine” data from electronic storage devices. 45 A
forensic search of an electronic device is generally conducted by an expert
analyst who uses a range of software programs to comb through enormous

40. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER SEARCH OF
ELECTRONIC DEVICES at 4 (2018).
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id.
43. Id. What CBP terms an “advanced search” involves a border agent connecting the device
to “external equipment” to “review, copy and/or analyze its contents.” This is much more invasive
than the “basic search” which involves an agent examining the device itself and “information
encountered at the border.”
44. The January 2018 CBP Directive makes reference to both “basic” and “advanced”
searches. “In the course of a basic search, with or without suspicion, an Officer may examine an
electronic device and may review and analyze information encountered at the border, subject to the
requirements and limitations provided herein and applicable law.” An “advanced search” is defined
by CBP as “any search in which an Officer connects external equipment, through a wired or wireless
connection, to an electronic device not merely to gain access to the device, but to review, copy, and/or
analyze its contents.” U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES at 4–5 (2018).
45. Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity Requirement,
7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 6 (2007).
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amounts of data, which can take days, weeks, or even months. 46 Notably,
this software is also capable of retrieving files that have been deleted,
increasingly the amount of digital information available to the
government during the search. 47
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION
A.

The Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonableness” Requirement

The Fourth Amendment protects both searches and seizures. 48 “A
‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable is infringed.” 49 Whether an individual’s
constitutional rights have been violated thus depends on whether or not
his privacy expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.” 50 A determination of whether a search is reasonable depends
on the context in which the search occurred, and courts have frequently
employed a balancing test, weighing “the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails.” 51
Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to
obtain a warrant, which requires a finding of probable cause, before
conducting a search. 52 In determining what constitutes probable cause, the
central question is whether the government official had a reasonable basis
for believing the law was being violated; if the facts asserted are “such
that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that
there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant.” 53 Probable cause is not a technical
standard; its definitions are based on “a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt” that amounts to “more than bare suspicion.” 54
46. Orin S. Kerr, Searches & Seizures in A Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 537–38
(2005).
47. Sean O’Grady, Note, All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace: Border Searches of
Electronic Devices in the Digital Age, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2255, 2270 (2019).
48. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
50. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).
51. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 537 (1967)).
52. Rankin, supra note 7, at 301.
53. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925).
54. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting McCarthy v. De Armit,
99 Pa. 63, 69 (Pa. 1881)).
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Even without probable cause, a law enforcement officer may
lawfully execute a limited search and seizure where he “observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot.” 55 The “reasonable suspicion”
standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio requires that an officer be able to
point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” 56 The
officer’s conduct is judged based on an objective standard—would a
reasonable person in the officer’s position agree that the action was
appropriate? 57 “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who
lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a
criminal to escape.” 58
B.

The Border Search Exception

While searches generally require a warrant issued on a finding of
probable cause, searches at the U.S. border are “reasonable” based solely
on where they occur due to “the long-standing right of the sovereign to
protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing
into this country.” 59 What is now known as the border search exception
was first recognized by the Supreme Court as early as 1886 60 and is
premised on protecting the integrity of our nation’s border. 61 The doctrine
serves the governmental interest of national security by preventing
travelers from bringing potentially harmful things into the U.S., such as
“communicable diseases, narcotics, or explosives.” 62 When crossing the
U.S. border, then, travelers are presumed to have a diminished expectation
of privacy as compared to elsewhere. 63

55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
56. Id. at 21.
57. Id. at 21–22.
58. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
59. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
60. Gregory T. Arnold, Criminal Law—Bordering on Unreasonableness?: The Third Circuit
Again Expands the Borders Search Exception in United States v. Hyde, 40 VILL. L. REV. 835, 842
(1995) (noting that the first case to recognize the border search exception was Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
61. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
62. Id. at 544.
63. “[A] port of entry is not a traveler’s home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the
search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of
them is discovered during such a search.” United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 (citing United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971)).
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The border search doctrine has been held to apply not only to
searches conducted at the actual border but also to searches conducted at
its “functional equivalent,” such as an international airport. 64 It is also
worth noting that the border search exception applies with equal force to
travelers crossing the U.S. border for the purpose of entering the country
as well as those exiting. 65
C.

Routine vs. Nonroutine Searches at the Border

Border searches may be characterized as “routine” or “nonroutine”
based on the “degree and nature of the intrusiveness involved.” 66 The
Supreme Court has made it clear that routine searches at the border may
be conducted without any degree of individualized suspicion. 67 More
intrusive, nonroutine searches, however, may only be performed where
law enforcement has reasonable suspicion. 68 Searches of a traveler’s
“outer clothing, luggage, and personal effects” have been classified as
routine searches, while more physically intrusive searches like “strip
searches, alimentary canal searches, x-rays, and the removal of an
artificial limb” are nonroutine searches that require reasonable
suspicion. 69
D.

Technology & the Border Search Exception

A series of cases have addressed the applicability of the border
search exception to searches of electronic devices. 70 This body of case law
suggests that courts must reconsider the border search exception where
law enforcement conducts searches of electronic devices. 71

64. Roberto Iraola, Terrorism, the Border, and the Fourth Amendment, FED. CTS. L. REV. 1,
para. 19 (2003) (noting that “a search and seizure that does not technically occur at the border may
still fall within the border search exception, as long as it takes place at the functional equivalent of
the border.”).
65. United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (4th Cir. 1995).
66. Iraola, supra note 64, at para. 12.
67. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
68. Id. at 541 (holding “[t]he detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine
customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in
her alimentary canal.”).
69. United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 853 (E.D. Va. 2016).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Touset, 890
F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
71. O’Grady, supra note 47, at 2280.
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In United States v. Ickes, a traveler attempted to enter the U.S. from
Canada when border agents searched his van, finding a computer and
disks containing child pornography. 72 Ickes filed a motion to suppress the
evidence from the computer and disks, arguing the search was
unconstitutional. 73 The district court determined that the search did not
require a warrant pursuant to the border search exception and denied
Ickes’s motion. 74 The Fourth Circuit affirmed 75: “[S]ince the birth of our
country, customs officials have wielded broad authority to search the
belongings of would-be entrants without obtaining a warrant and without
establishing probable cause.” 76 The Fourth Circuit emphasized the strong
governmental interest in preventing contraband (here, child pornography)
from entering the country and the traveler’s diminished expectation of
privacy at the border. 77
Three years later in United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether federal agents at an international airport could
lawfully search a traveler’s computer without reasonable suspicion. 78
Arnold, returning to the United States from the Philippines, was stopped
by CBP officers who searched his laptop and electronic storage devices,
which contained child pornography. 79 Arnold was charged with
transporting and possessing child pornography and attempting to engage
in illicit sexual conduct. 80 Arnold moved to suppress the evidence
obtained from his devices, which the district court granted after
determining reasonable suspicion was required and that the government
lacked reasonable suspicion at the time of the search. 81 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “reasonable suspicion is not needed
for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage
devices at the border.” 82
The Ninth Circuit revisited border searches of electronic devices in
United States v. Cotterman in 2013. 83 Cotterman attempted to enter the
United States from Mexico when border agents confiscated his two

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 507–08.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506.
See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1005–06.
Id.
Id. at 1008.
See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
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laptops and three digital cameras. 84 Cotterman was previously convicted
of several sex-related offenses, producing a “hit” in the Treasury
Enforcement Communication System. 85 Cotterman’s devices were
forensically searched. 86 An initial search of one of the laptops revealed
hundreds of images of child pornography. 87 Cotterman was indicted for a
plethora of child pornography offenses and moved to suppress the
evidence obtained from his devices. 88 The district court granted
Cotterman’s motion after agreeing with the magistrate that the search was
an “extended border search” requiring reasonable suspicion 89 and that the
government lacked reasonable suspicion at the time of the search.90
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the strong
governmental interest in protecting our nation’s borders but recognized
the border search exception is a narrow one. 91 “Even at the border,
individual privacy rights are not abandoned but ‘balanced against the
sovereign’s interests.’” 92 While the initial search of Cotterman’s devices
was appropriate even without any degree of suspicion, the search was
“transformed into something far different” when the devices were taken
off the premises and forensically analyzed. 93 “It is the comprehensive and
intrusive nature of a forensic examination—not the location of the
examination—that is the key factor triggering the requirement of
reasonable suspicion here.” 94

84. Id. at 957. The Treasury Enforcement Communications System (referred to as “TECS”) is
owned and managed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The system allows border agents to
screen and make determinations regarding admissibility of travelers entering the U.S. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE TECS
SYSTEM: CBP PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESSING (TECS) NATIONAL SAR INITIATIVE (2011),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp-tecs-sar-update_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DV5A-M83S].
85. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957.
86. Id. at 958.
87. Id. at 959.
88. Id.
89. An extended border search is characterized as a “search away from the border where entry
is not apparent, but where the dual requirements of reasonable certainty of a recent border crossing
and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are satisfied.” Id. at 961 (citing United States v. GuzmanPadilla, 571 F.3d 865, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009)). The extended border search is premised on the notion
that once an individual crosses the border, he regains a substantial privacy interest. Id. at 961. Since
the intrusion is greater, the government needs reasonable suspicion to justify an extended border
search. Id. The Ninth Circuit ultimately found the extended border search doctrine inapplicable. Id.
at 962.
90. Id. at 959.
91. Id. at 960.
92. Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985)).
93. Id. at 961.
94. Id. at 962.
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In coming to the conclusion that forensic searches require reasonable
suspicion, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the immense amount of data that
modern electronic devices are capable of housing. 95 Digital storage
devices have the potential to contain exponentially more information than
“a car full of packed suitcases” ever could. 96 The court also noted the
sensitivity and personal nature of the information typically stored on
electronic devices: “Laptop computers, iPads and the like are
simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They contain the most
intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business
documents, medical records and private emails.” 97 Based on these
considerations, the Ninth Circuit held that the forensic search of
Cotterman’s devices required a showing of reasonable suspicion by the
government. 98
In 2014, the Supreme Court had the opportunity in Riley v. California
to consider whether law enforcement could search cell phones seized
incident to the arrests 99 of defendants in two consolidated cases. 100 In the
first case, police stopped Riley for driving with expired registration tags,
and he was arrested after officers found two handguns in the vehicle. 101
Police confiscated and searched Riley’s cell phone, revealing evidence of
Riley’s involvement in gang activity. 102 Riley sought to suppress the
information obtained from his cell phone, asserting the search was
unconstitutional because it was conducted without a warrant. 103 The trial
court rejected Riley’s argument, and the California Court of Appeals
affirmed.
In the second case, police arrested Wurie after observing what they
believed to be a drug deal. After taking him back to the station, officers
confiscated Wurie’s two cell phones and used information from one of the
phones to locate Wurie’s apartment. 104 Upon obtaining a warrant, officers
found “crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and
95. Id. at 964.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 968.
99. The “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement is different from the
border search doctrine that has been discussed thus far. “Search of the person becomes lawful when
grounds for arrest and accusation have been discovered, and the law is in the act of subjecting the
body of the accused to its physical dominion.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 232 (1973)
(quoting People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197 (N.Y. 1923)).
100. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
101. Id. at 378.
102. Id. at 379.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 373.
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ammunition, and cash.” 105 Wurie sought to suppress the evidence from his
apartment, asserting “it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search of his
cell phone.” 106 The district court disagreed with this argument, and Wurie
was convicted. The First Circuit reversed, finding cell phones “distinct
from other physical possessions that may be searched incident to arrest
without a warrant.” 107
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that law enforcement generally
must secure a warrant before searching a cellular device even where the
search is pursuant to an arrest, recognizing the unique nature of cell
phones and the digital content they store. 108 The Riley Court called the
term “cell phone” a “misleading shorthand” because of its immense
storage capacity and the sensitive nature of the personal data such devices
are capable of storing. 109 To make matters worse, cloud computing
increases the amount of data accessible from the search of an electronic
device, as data may be “stored on remote servers rather than on the device
itself.” 110
In United States v. Vergara in 2018, the Eleventh Circuit found the
forensic search of a traveler’s cell phones at the border to be lawful even
without a warrant or probable cause. When Vergara returned from a trip
to Mexico, CBP officers stopped him and searched one of his phones. The
officers discovered a video of partially nude minors, submitted all of
Vergara’s phones for forensic analysis, and discovered more photos and
videos depicting sexually explicit conduct involving minors. Vergara
sought to suppress this evidence, but the district court found the search
was lawful and did not require any degree of particularized suspicion. In
doing so, the court rejected Vergara’s argument that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Riley required a warrant for the forensic search, finding Riley’s
holding limited to the search incident to arrest exception and having no
application to border searches. The district court reasoned that regardless
of whether any degree of suspicion was required, the officers in this case
had reasonable suspicion that Vergara possessed child pornography. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 111

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 397.
United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2018).
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IV. KOLSUZ & TOUSET: DIFFERING OPINIONS BETWEEN THE FOURTH
AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS
A.

United States v. Kolsuz (Fourth Circuit)

Hamza Kolsuz, a Turkish citizen, attempted to board an international
flight when he was stopped by federal customs agents. On two prior
occasions, Kolsuz attempted to transport firearms parts listed on the
United States Munitions List (“USML”) 112 into the U.S. without an
appropriate license. Upon learning that Kolsuz would be travelling back
to Turkey, a border agent alerted CBP officers at the airport. A search of
Kolsuz’s luggage revealed several firearm parts listed on the USML,
which Kolsuz lacked the requisite federal license to remove from the
country. 113
The customs officers conducted two searches of Kolsuz’s
smartphone: first, a manual search, then a forensic search. The manual
search “involved using the iPhone’s touch screen, which was not
password protected, to scroll through Kolsuz’s recent calls and text
messages.” The cell phone was taken four miles away from the airport and
connected to a “Cellebrite Physical Analyzer,” which produced an 896page report detailing Kolsuz’s “personal contact lists, emails, messenger
conversations, photographs, videos, calendar, web browsing history, and
call logs, along with a history of Kolsuz’s physical location down to
precise GPS coordinates.” 114
Kolsuz was indicted on counts of “attempting to export firearms parts
on the USML without a license . . . attempting to smuggle goods from the
United States . . . and conspiracy to commit those offenses.” 115 Kolsuz
sought to suppress the evidence obtained from the forensic search, arguing
the search was “nonroutine” and required reasonable suspicion. 116 The
district court denied Kolsuz’s motion. 117 While the district court found the
forensic search to be “nonroutine,” and thus required some degree of
particularized suspicion, 118 the search was reasonable because the
government had reasonable suspicion Kolsuz’s phone would provide

112. The United States Munitions List (USML) is comprised of “defense articles and defense
services” whose importation and exportation are regulated by the federal government through the
Arms Export Control Act. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (2014).
113. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 138–139 (4th Cir. 2018).
114. Id. at 139.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 860 (E.D. Va. 2016).
118. Id. at 858.
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evidence relevant to the charged crimes. 119 Kolsuz was found guilty on all
counts and “sentenced to 30 months in prison and three years of
supervised release.” 120
Kolsuz’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit was narrowly focused on
whether the second search of his cell phone—the forensic search—fell
within the border search exception. Kolsuz first argued the forensic search
was too far removed in time and space from Kolsuz’s departure to be
considered a border search and should be treated as a search incident to
arrest, requiring a warrant based on probable cause. In arguing the forensic
search was not a border search, Kolsuz emphasized that “the government
interest that underlies the border search exception—preventing
contraband from crossing a border—was no longer at issue” because
Kolsuz was arrested, and his phone had already been confiscated at the
time of the search. 121
The Fourth Circuit rejected Kolsuz’s arguments, finding a sufficient
“nexus” between the forensic search and the government’s interest in
performing the search. In finding such a connection, the court analyzed
the factual circumstances surrounding the search:
Government agents forensically searched Kolsuz’s phone because they
had reason to believe—and good reason to believe, in the form of two
suitcases filled with firearms parts—that Kolsuz was attempting to
export firearms illegally and without a license. That is a transnational
offense that goes to the heart of the border search exception, which rests
in part on the sovereign interest of protecting and monitoring exports
from the country. 122

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the forensic search of Kolsuz’s
phone fell squarely within the border search exception. 123 Even so, Kolsuz
argued, the forensic search was nonroutine and thus “require[ed] some
level of particularized suspicion”—an argument well taken by the
court. 124 Recognizing that even border searches may require some degree
of suspicion if sufficiently intrusive, the Fourth Circuit noted that “the
sheer quantity of data stored on smartphones and other digital devices
119. Id. at 860.
120. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 139–41.
121. Id. at 141–42. Kolsuz argued that the forensic search, which took place “miles from the
airport,” was no longer a border search at all. Kolsuz argued that the search, although conducted after
Kolsuz’s arrest, required a warrant pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Riley that cell phones
may only be searched incident to a lawful arrest upon a finding of probable cause and issuance of a
warrant. Id. (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02 (2014)).
122. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143.
123. Id. at 144.
124. Id.
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dwarfs the amount of personal information that can be carried over a
border—and thus subjected to a routine border search—in luggage or a
car.” 125
The Fourth Circuit proceeded to address the “uniquely sensitive
nature” of the information obtained from forensic searches of electronic
devices, which often includes “financial records, confidential business
documents, medical records, and private emails.” 126 The court
characterized this data as being comprised of “the most intimate details of
our lives” and recognized that international travelers cannot simply leave
this electronic information at home in the same way they could leave
behind other tangible items that they do not wish to subject to a search. 127
The Fourth Circuit concluded that “[a] forensic search of a digital
phone must be treated as a nonroutine border search, requiring some form
of individualized suspicion.” 128 Since the customs officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct the forensic search of Kolsuz’s phone, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.129
B.

United States v. Touset (Eleventh Circuit)

After investigations revealed multiple monetary transfers to an
account in the Philippines— a “source countr[y] for sex tourism and child
pornography”—the U.S. government suspected Touset was involved in
child pornography. Since Touset was out of the country at the time, DHS
“placed a ‘look-out’ on Touset so that his luggage and electronic devices
would be searched when he returned to the country.” 130
Upon returning to the U.S., a border agent searched his luggage,
finding “two iPhones, a camera, two laptops, two external hard drives, and
two tablets.” The agent manually inspected the phones and camera, and
the laptops, hard drives, and tablets were subjected to a forensic search,
revealing child pornography. Touset was indicted on counts of
“knowingly receiving child pornography, . . . knowingly transporting and
shipping child pornography, . . . and knowingly possessing a computer
and storage device containing child pornography.” 131
Touset sought to suppress the evidence obtained from the forensic
searches. The magistrate determined the search required reasonable
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 145–47.
Id. at 146–48.
United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1230–31.
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suspicion, and that the government had reasonable suspicion at the time
of the search. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation
that Touset’s motion to suppress be denied. Touset pleaded guilty to
knowingly transporting child pornography and was sentenced to “120
months in prison and supervision for life.” 132
The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the proposition that routine searches
conducted at the border are reasonable simply on the basis that they occur
at the border. Moreover, the court noted that neither the Eleventh Circuit
nor the Supreme Court has ever required any degree of suspicion to search
travelers’ property at the border regardless of the “type” of property that
was the subject of the search. Based on this unforgiving precedent, the
court “[saw] no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require
suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no
such requirement for a search of other personal property.” 133
Reasonable suspicion has been required, the Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged, for “highly intrusive searches of a person’s body” at the
border such as strip searches or x-ray examinations, which are notably
different than any search of a person’s belongings. The court cited three
factors which may be used to identify the “indignity” to be suffered by an
individual subjected to a nonroutine search: “(1) physical contact between
the searcher and the person searched; (2) exposure of intimate body parts;
and (3) use of force.” The Eleventh Circuit found none of these factors
applicable to a forensic search. 134
The Eleventh Circuit compared the forensic search of Touset’s
devices to the physical search of a vehicle’s fuel tank seen in FloresMontano. 135 The court reasoned:
And it does not make sense to say that electronic devices should receive
special treatment because so many people now own them or because
they can store vast quantities of records or effects. The same could be
said for a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractortrailer loaded with boxes of documents. Border agents bear the same
responsibility for preventing the importation of contraband in a
traveler’s possession regardless of advances in technology. 136

The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged, but ultimately rejected, the
differing opinions of the Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz and the Ninth Circuit in

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1232–33.
Id. at 1234.
See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
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Cotterman. The court noted that it is not the “extensiveness” of a search
that matters but the “personal indignity” suffered. The court emphasized
that “property and persons are different,” and the search of digital data
does not “trigger this kind of indignity.” 137
The Eleventh Circuit, balancing the two interests at stake, concluded
that the government’s interest in excluding certain persons and contraband
from the border outweighs a traveler’s privacy interest. When crossing the
border, the court reasoned, an individual’s expectation of privacy is
diminished and there is no constitutional “guarantee [to] the right to travel
without great inconvenience.” To the contrary, travelers should expect
some degree of inconvenience as incident to achieving a greater common
good—national security. If a traveler does not want to subject his personal
property to a search, the court reasoned, he can eliminate that risk by
leaving his devices at home. 138
If reasonable suspicion was required to conduct the forensic search
of Touset’s devices, the Eleventh Circuit believed it would “create special
protection for the property most often used to store and disseminate child
pornography.” 139 Offenses relating to child pornography heavily utilize
the internet and electronic devices for the “receipt, storage and
distribution of unlawful images.” 140 The court reasoned that requiring
reasonable suspicion to conduct forensic searches would impede the
government’s interest in excluding this type of contraband from our
nation’s borders. 141 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit went even further,
suggesting the overwhelming presence of technology in our society
actually weighs in favor of the government’s broad discretion to search
travelers’ devices at the border. 142
Rather than imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement through the
judiciary, the Eleventh Circuit recommended leaving the task of setting
the appropriate standard to the legislative process, as this would allow for
a more informed decision on the matter. The court suggested that
deferring to the legislature in the area of border searches is “especially
important,” and there has been a “longstanding historical practice” of
doing so. 143

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1235–36.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236–37.
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As in Kolsuz, a determination of whether any degree of suspicion is
required to conduct a forensic search at the border was not outcomedeterminative in Touset because the Eleventh Circuit found the
government had a “particularized and objective basis” to search Touset’s
devices for child pornography. 144
V. A CALL FOR CHANGE: THE CURRENT “SUSPICIONLESS STANDARD”
AND THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
A.

Tension Between Circuits and the Need for Consistency

The Fourth and Eleventh Circuit’s differing conclusions emphasize
a gray area in the border search exception as travelers cross the border
with electronic devices not likely conceived of when the doctrine was
established. 145 The Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz recognized the unique
challenges of our digital world—forensic searches of electronic devices
may be especially intrusive with respect to a traveler’s privacy interest
and thus should be treated differently than manual searches. 146 The
Eleventh Circuit in Touset, on the other hand, refused to make a
distinction between classes of property searched at the border. 147
Following Kolsuz and Touset, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Wanjiku found the search of a traveler’s electronic devices at the border
constitutional because agents acted on reasonable suspicion “at a time
when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any
search at the border.” 148 Interestingly, the defendant in Wanjiku argued
that searches of electronic devices are nonroutine, requiring at least
reasonable suspicion and arguably even a warrant. 149 Because the officers
had reasonable suspicion, the Seventh Circuit declined to identify any
particular standard as the appropriate level of scrutiny for border searches
of electronic devices: “We therefore need not reach the issue of what level
of suspicion is required (if any) for searches of electronic devices at the
border, and reserve that question for a case in which it matters to the
outcome.” 150

144. Id. at 1237.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Touset,
890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018).
146. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144–46.
147. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
148. United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2019).
149. Id. at 478.
150. Id. at 488–89.
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Wanjiku demonstrates the uncertainty courts face in the wake of
Kolsuz and Touset and the dissonance among circuits. The question
remains: at the border, should electronic devices be subject to the same
standard as routine searches, or do these devices present unique privacy
considerations that warrant application of higher scrutiny? While there are
differing opinions surrounding what the appropriate standard may be, 151
consistency is needed to serve both the governmental interest in national
security and the privacy interests of international travelers. 152
B.

Electronic Devices Are More than Mere “Containers”

It has been argued that the “suspicionless” standard is most
appropriate because it “avoids the creation of arbitrary distinctions
between different types of property” and more effectively deters criminal
activity. 153 Some commentators have even asserted that treating electronic
devices in the same manner as “traditional” storage devices is logical
because they serve the same functional purpose: storage. 154 But the ability
of electronic devices to store a large quantity of “deeply personal” or
“embarrassing” information about the device’s user requires a distinction
between searches of electronic devices from searches of other personal
items belonging to a traveler, such as “wallets, purses, luggage, and other
containers.” 155
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s view in Touset, an electronic
device is starkly different than a “tractor-trailer loaded with boxes of

151. Aisha J. Dennis, Riling Up the Border Search Doctrine: Litigating Searches of Digital
Content at Our Ports of Entry, THE CHAMPION, March 2018 at 40, 44 (arguing the appropriate level
of suspicion required for federal officers to search electronic devices at the border is “currently an
open question in light of Riley v. California,” and that advocates should continue to update courts on
technological advancements that make these searches different from traditional items of personal
property normally subject to search).
152. With conflicting standards from CBP, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, and proposed
legislation, there is uncertainty at the border for both travelers and law enforcement. Gina R.
Bohannon, Notes & Comment, Cell Phones and the Border Search Exception: Circuit Split Over the
Line Between Sovereignty and Privacy, 78 MD. L. REV. 563, 587 (2019).
153. Michael Creta, A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit Requires Reasonable
Suspicion for Forensic Searches of Electronic Storage Devices During Border Searches in United
States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C.L. Rev. E-Supplement 31, 40–41 (2014) (arguing also that the focus
should be on changing CBP directives to place stricter limits on the manner in which customs officers
may store and retain information obtained from a forensic search of an electronic device at the border).
154. Id. at 41 (“Focusing on how information is used, as opposed to when it can be collected, is
an administratively practical standard that avoids tampering with constitutional doctrine and also
strikes an appropriate balance between border protection goals and personal privacy interests.”).
155. Bret E. Rasner, International Travelers Beware: No Reasonable Suspicion Needed to
Search Your Electronic Storage Devices at the Border, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 669, 697 (2010).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 7

708

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:nnn

documents.” 156 The Fourth Circuit in Ickes addressed the issue of whether
an electronic device is merely “cargo” or something more, ultimately
finding the search of a traveler’s computer and disks lawful pursuant to
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which authorizes customs officers to search “any
person, trunk, package, or cargo on board [a vessel].” 157 In coming to this
conclusion, the Fourth Circuit consulted Black’s Law Dictionary, which
defined “cargo” as “goods transported by a vessel, airplane, or vehicle.”158
The court determined that the computer and disks fell within the definition
of “cargo,” and “to hold otherwise would undermine the longstanding
practice of seizing goods at the border even when the type of good is not
specified in the statute.” 159 Moreover, in light of the government’s
historical “power and interest” at the border, and courts’ historically broad
interpretation of § 1581(a), the Fourth Circuit found the search lawful. 160
In his defense, Ickes asserted that the court’s holding was sweeping
because “any person carrying a laptop computer . . . on an international
flight would be subject to a search of the files on the computer hard
drive.” 161 The court characterized Ickes’s prediction as “far-fetched”
because agents at the border lack the time and resources to perform a
search of every computer. 162 But the mere unlikeliness of such a search
should not negate the constitutional implications it may have on those few
individuals who are, in fact, subjected to a forensic search of their
electronic devices at the border. In accordance with the current view that
no suspicion is required to perform forensic searches at the border, any
international traveler must assume the risk of their device being
confiscated, forensically searched, and the data copied and stored.163
Electronic devices should not be thought of as closed containers due
to the vast amount of information these devices are capable of storing as
well as the uniquely private and sensitive nature of that information. Some
have argued that, because of the quantity and sensitive quality of
information produced, the search of an electronic device is akin to the

156. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2018).
157. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005).
158. Id. at 504 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
159. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 505.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 506–07.
162. Id.
163. Rankin, supra note 7, at 319 (“In short, current federal policy permits the government to
seize the computer of any person crossing the national border, make a complete copy of the hard
drive, and then search through every file and folder until it discovers something illegal, all without
any suspicion of criminal activity.”).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/7

22

Pursel: Border Search Exception

2019]

BORDER SEARCH EXCEPTION

709

search of a traveler’s home. 164 Unlike a suitcase, a traveler’s electronic
device may contain “precious memories, important files, and confidential
information all in one place” and often contains even more information
about the traveler than her home would. 165 The average traveler likely
expects to undergo routine searches in the interest of national security; at
the airport, for example, travelers expect TSA agents to search their
luggage for weapons that could injure others on the plane. But a traveler
hardly expects their phone to be confiscated and digital data extracted. 166
A key distinction between electronic devices and traditional
“containers” lies in the fact that a forensic search of an electronic device
will reveal not only data currently stored on the device but also
information that has been deleted. 167 While a traveler can remove
anything from his suitcase that he does not want to be searched, nothing
can truly be removed from an electronic device.168 Moreover, routine
searches aimed primarily at promoting the government’s interest in
national security divulge little personal information about the traveler,
whereas forensic searches of electronic devices “may reveal a person’s
entire life or career.” 169 As technology improves, so does the quantity and
diversity of the information capable of being stored on our digital devices,
and eventually, forensic analysts may be capable of completely

164. The search of electronic devices differs from the search a traveler’s wallet or briefcase
because an electronic device “contains exponentially more information than wallets or briefcases and
often contains information the owner does not know is stored on the device.” Carolyn James,
Balancing Interests at the Border: Protecting Our Nation and our Privacy in Border Searches of
Electronic Devices, 27 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J., 219, 222 (2011). Because a laptop search can
often reveal as much information about a person as a search of that person’s house would, traveling
internationally with an electronic device is like “crossing the border with your home in your suitcase.”
Id. (quoting Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronics Searches, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/AR2008020604763.html
[https://perma.cc/GEC8-TXRM & https://perma.cc/7SFL-SDZM].
165. Kindal Wright, Border Searches in A Modern World: Are Laptops Merely Closed
Containers, or Are They Something More?, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 701, 721–22 (2009).
166. Joelle Hoffman, Reasonable Suspicion Should Be Required at A Minimum for Customs
Officials to Execute A Search of A Laptop at U.S. Borders: Why U.S. v. Arnold Got It Wrong, 36 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 173, 181–82 (2009).
167. Kerr, supra note 46, at 542 (“[F]orensic analysts can often recover deleted files from a hard
drive. They can do that because marking a file as “deleted” normally does not actually delete the
fileFalse”).
168. Robert M. Yost, Deleting Privacy Bit by Bit: An Analysis of U.S. v. Arnold & Suspicionless
Border Searches of Laptop Computers & Electronic Devices, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 303,
318 (2009) (noting that electronic devices pose the unique problem of “lingering and pervasive data
storage, whereby physical removal of its contents by its owner does not actually result in removal.”).
169. Hoffman, supra note 166, at 182.
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reconstructing a person’s life “with remarkable accuracy” using the data
stored on that individual’s devices. 170
In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit distinguished electronic devices
from other “containers,” reasoning that a traveler can choose what he
packs in his suitcase but cannot do the same with his electronic devices
because deleting files may be impractical, time consuming, and deleted
files may remain on the device nonetheless. 171 “This quality makes it
impractical, if not impossible, for individuals to make meaningful
decisions regarding what digital content to expose to the scrutiny that
accompanies international travel. A person’s digital life ought not be
hijacked simply by crossing a border.” 172
In Vergara, the district court reasoned that if the defendant “entered
the country with child pornography images in a notebook, the notebook
would have been subject to inspection, and he cannot be allowed to
insulate himself from inspection by storing child pornography
electronically on his cellphone.” 173 Surely, however, it cannot be
contended that a notebook can hold the same amount of information
capable of being stored on an electronic device.
Circuit Judge Jill Pryor’s dissent in Vergara is insightful in
considering how electronic devices differ from other “containers.” Judge
Pryor disagreed with “the majority’s dismissal of the significant privacy
interests implicated in cell phone searches” and recommended that
forensic searches require “a warrant supported by probable cause.” Our
devices can expose sensitive personal information relating to “addiction,
religious practices, pregnancy, personal finances, and romance.” 174 It is
unlikely the same can be said of a traveler’s other belongings.
C.

Forensic Searches Should be Considered “Nonroutine”

Perhaps the most important question that must be addressed in
determining the appropriate standard for forensic searches of electronic
devices at the border is one of scope: are nonroutine searches, for which
reasonable suspicion is required, limited to searches of a traveler’s
person? 175 The Supreme Court should answer this question in the
170. Kerr, supra note 46, at 569.
171. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013).
172. Id.
173. United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018).
174. Id. at 1315–16 (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
175. Lindsay E. Harrell, Down to the Last .jpeg: Addressing the Constitutionality of
Suspicionless Border Searches of Computers & One Court’s Pioneering Approach in United States
v. Arnold, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 205, 222 (2008).
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negative, extending the reasonable suspicion requirement to the forensic
search of electronic devices.
Rather than viewing forensic searches as an extension of a manual
search, such searches should be subject to the same standard as other
highly intrusive or “particularly offensive” searches.176 The rationale of
the border search exception is based on national security and the ability
of the federal government to interrupt the transportation of dangerous
items such as “bombs, weapons, communicable diseases, narcotics, or
explosives” across the U.S. border. 177 These kinds of “contraband” can be
directly related to the immediate safety of American citizens, and one can
understand why the federal government would want great discretion in
searching for these items. 178 Forensic searches of electronic devices,
however, do not comport with this “logical purpose” of the border search
doctrine, nor do they comport with the public’s understanding of border
searches. 179 Further, while the Supreme Court has characterized the
government’s interest as “at its zenith” at the border, the Riley decision
suggests that a traveler’s privacy rights should be given additional
protection when border agents wish to search her electronic device. 180
For purposes of determining the appropriate standard, our electronic
devices more closely resemble an extension of our person than tangible
personal property. 181 Nonroutine searches have thus far been limited to
searches of a traveler’s person, as the Supreme Court has yet to find a
search of traveler’s property nonroutine. 182 However, because a forensic
search of a traveler’s device reveals so much detailed information about
that individual, these searches should be characterized as nonroutine. In
Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court recognized “the dignity and privacy
interests of the person being searched” may require “some level of
suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person.” 183 Even

176. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541–42 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Victoria Wilson, Laptops and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment:
Protecting the United States Borders from Bombs, Drugs, and the Pictures From Your Vacation, 65
U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1009 (2011).
178. See Wright, supra note 165, at 723 (“The purpose behind the broad scope of the border
search exception to the Fourth Amendment is that the government is seeking to prevent the entry of
contraband into the United States in order to protect its citizens.”).
179. Wilson, supra note 177, at 1008–10.
180. Dennis, supra note 151, at 44.
181. Wright, supra note 165, at 722 (“[I]f the courts are looking to analogize laptops to
something, they should find that computers are more accurately analogized to the human body than
to a closed container.”).
182. O’Grady, supra note 47, at 2257.
183. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
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at the border, however, a traveler will be entitled to greater Fourth
Amendment protection where the government seeks to employ “highly
intrusive techniques.” 184 One can imagine how forensic searches may fit
into this category.
Courts have drawn what some commentators have identified as a
“bright-line rule” between the intrusive search of a traveler’s person and
the search of a traveler’s personal effects, suggesting the heightened
privacy concerns of the traveler could not be asserted if it is merely his
property that is subjected to search. 185 However, the Supreme Court has
not foreclosed the idea that some searches of a traveler’s property,
although occurring at the border, may be “so intrusive that they require
reasonable suspicion.” 186
While the forensic search of an electronic device is not literally
intrusive into the traveler’s person, as a strip search would be, it can be
viewed as substantially intrusive into the traveler’s mind. 187 The district
court in Arnold noted that “some may value the sanctity of private
thoughts memorialized on a data storage device above physical
privacy.” 188 It is certainly possible to imagine how a traveler would be
willing to undergo a pat-down search of his person to detect a weapon or
other dangerous object, as this seems perfectly logical with respect to the
government’s interest in national security. But forcing a traveler to subject
her devices to a forensic search may constitute a “government
intrusion[]into the mind” 189 that may cause any traveler to become
184. Bohannon, supra note 152, at 573.
185. Nicole Kolinski, United States v. Arnold: Legally Correct but Logistically Impractical, 6
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 31, 44 (2009).
186. Marianne Leach, Flyers Beware: The Ninth Circuit Decision, United States v. Arnold,
Granted Customs Agents Access into Your Laptops, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 307, 311 (2009), citing
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 n.2 (2004). See also United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606, 616 n.13 (1977) (declining to “decide whether, and under what circumstances, a border
search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is
carried out.”).
187. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
188. Id. (recognizing that searching the digital contents of a laptop involves “dignity and privacy
interests” in the same way that “highly intrusive searches of persons” do and the fact that it is not a
“physical intrusion” does not place it outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection).
189. Just as an individual’s physical possessions can be intruded upon, the Ninth Circuit has
suggested that there may be a “psychological intrusion” where an individual fears a particular search.
“Imposition of fear is a psychological intrusion.” United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 716
(9th Cir. 2002). Flores-Montano subsequently found the search at issue in Molina-Tarazon did not
require reasonable suspicion; since the “thing” searched was a vehicle, which was not sufficiently
intrusive, the Ninth Circuit’s “complex balancing tests” were inappropriate. Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. at 152. However, the Molina-Tarazon decision is useful in identifying the right of citizens to be
free not only from physical intrusions, but searches that are intrusive into one’s mind. In evaluating
the intrusiveness of electronic searches, psychological intrusiveness should be considered as a factor.
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afraid. 190 In evaluating the intrusiveness of a forensic search, the Supreme
Court should give considerable weight to the “psychological intrusion” 191
these types of searches are likely to affect. By recognizing forensic
searches as “nonroutine” and requiring reasonable suspicion as a
prerequisite for conducting these searches, the “unique privacy interests
in digital data highlighted in Riley and Carpenter” could be acknowledged
while upholding “the government’s traditional right to secure and protect
the border.” 192
D.

Public Policy and Racial Profiling at the Border

Many international travelers of certain racial, ethnic, or religious
groups already face increased scrutiny when traveling, and granting such
broad discretion to border agents to conduct forensic searches of
electronic devices makes privacy violations far more likely for these
individuals. 193 While the issue of religious and racial profiling arises in
many aspects of our society, it has significant consequence in the context
of border searches. The government should retain the ability to search any
individual’s electronic devices where that individual is suspected of
criminal activity, regardless of race or religion. But members of specific
racial or religious groups should not be asked to expose sensitive personal
information contained on their electronic devices solely on the basis of a
border agent’s personal biases.
As of August 10, 2017, DHS maintains that “[i]t is the policy of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to prohibit the consideration of
race or ethnicity in law enforcement, investigation, and screening
activities, in all but the most exceptional circumstances” so that “racial
and ethnic stereotypes will not be used in conducting stops, searches, and

190. Harrell, supra note 175, at 224–25 (“[A]n intrusion into a person’s most private thoughts
and expressions memorialized in electronic files could frighten or annoy a traveler passing through
customs.”).
191. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 716.
192. O’Grady, supra note 47, at 2282. In Carpenter, the Supreme Court found that cell phone
location data is within the protection of the Fourth Amendment even though the information was
obtained from a third party. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). While not
discussed at length in this article, the Carpenter decision provides insight into the Supreme Court’s
view of technology in the Fourth Amendment context: “As technology has enhanced the
Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court
has sought to ‘assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” Id. at 2214.
193. Jillian A. Bates, The Forensic Digital Search of Cell Phones at the Border in United States
v. Kolsuz: Tough on Terrorism or Tough on Petty Crime?, 41 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 39, 43 (2019).
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other law enforcement activities.” 194 Just a few sentences later, the DHS
policy states that “CBP personnel may use race or ethnicity when a
compelling governmental interest is present and its use is narrowly
tailored to that interest” and allows CBP officers to consider nationality
“for the vast majority of situations” border agents may find themselves
in. 195 The federal government seems to be condemning racial and ethnic
profiling except where it serves a governmental interest, and as a result,
border agents have a dangerous amount of discretion in determining
which travelers to subject to extensive search. 196 Allowing border agents
to conduct forensic searches subjectively, without imposing any objective
standards, arguably undermines the ability of those agents to protect our
borders. 197
E.

Making a Distinction Between Types of Contraband

Unlike other border searches, the governmental interest in national
security does not justify warrantless searches of electronic devices at the
border. 198 Most of the cases involving forensic searches of electronics at
the border have involved child pornography, 199 while the types of
contraband contemplated when the border search doctrine was first
recognized are related to national security threats. 200 Certainly, it need not
194. CBP Policy on Nondiscrimination in Law Enforcement Activities and all other
Administered Programs, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., (August 10, 2017),
https://www.cbp.gov/about/eeo-diversity/policies/nondiscrimination-law-enforcement-activitiesand-all-other-administered# [https://perma.cc/3KVW-A94X].
195. Id. (“Race or ethnicity-based information that is specific to particular suspects or incidents
or ongoing criminal activities, schemes, or enterprises may be considered.”).
196. See Bector, supra note 13, at 711 (recognizing that a suspicionless standard “may lead to
searches that are arbitrary, unnecessary, or involve racial profiling.”).
197. Any traveler crossing the border—even those who pose no threat to national security—can
be subjected to forensic search under the current standard, and “[c]onducting searches of persons on
a subjective basis removes the ability of officers to conduct searches with the objective interest of
protecting national security.” Darianne De Leon, Comment, What Matters More: Preserving a
Fundamental Right to Privacy or Tampering with Another’s Dignity Through Searches Because of
“Reasonable Suspicion”, 27 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 553, 567 (2019).
198. Wright, supra note 165, at 723–24 (arguing that a traveler who wants to get digital
contraband into the United States need not physically cross a border to do so, as they can transmit the
same information through email or by posting it to the internet).
199. Shannon L. Smith, Abidor & House: Lost Opportunities to Sync the Border Search
Doctrine with Today’s Technology, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 223, 228 (2014).
200. While the original justifications for the border search exception were financial (based on
collection of taxes), the Supreme Court later concluded that “national self protection” was an
appropriate justification for allowing searches to occur at the border without a warrant. During the
war on drugs, the doctrine was used to prevent the smuggling of narcotics across the United States
border. Today, the doctrine has been extended to apply to the movement of any “dangerous items”
across the border. Wilson, supra note 177, at 1003–1005.
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be explained why the U.S. would seek to exclude child pornography from
its borders; however, this type of contraband does not pose the same
immediate threat to national security as a weapon or explosive.
Further, the border search exception should not be used as “general
crime prevention” 201 as this creates potential for abuse and intrudes
significantly “into the privacy of ordinary U.S. citizens.” 202 In advocating
for a requirement of some degree of particularized suspicion where border
agents seek to forensically search a traveler’s device, the goal is certainly
not to encourage importation of contraband. However, the current policy
is overinclusive, affecting millions of international travelers.203 Moreover,
unlike the “dangerous” forms of contraband that the border search
exception historically sought to exclude from the country, the
government’s interest in excluding digital contraband is not any greater at
the border. 204
While a traveler would expect federal agents at the border to inspect
his or her laptop’s “physical inner workings” to make sure it does not
contain an explosive, it is a different matter entirely to search the device’s
“digital inner workings” as this search “is only incidentally connected to
the physical place where the search is being conducted.”205 CBP maintains
that “[searches of electronic devices] are part of CBP’s longstanding
practice and are essential to enforcing the law at the U.S. border and to
protecting border security.” 206 However, imposing a standard that requires
border agents to demonstrate reasonable suspicion would pose virtually
no national security risks because, while undesirable, digital contraband
such as child pornography does not implicate the physical and imminent
threats to national security contemplated at the adoption of the border

201. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
202. Id. (citing United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998)).
203. Rankin, supra note 7, at 347 (arguing that attorneys may have privileged information on
their electronic devices, international students may experience interference with their studies due to
delay resulting from their devices being seized, and “other law-abiding citizens” will be subjected to
a serious invasion of privacy as “their most private emails, photographs, financial data, and other
effects” are searched).
204. Wilson, supra note 177, at 1013 (arguing that “[o]ther than the location where the search
would take place, the search of laptop files has little to do at all with the borders; there is nothing
exceptional or dangerous about information, ideas, and data being physically carried across the border
on a hard drive that makes it more reasonable to search than the same data, located on the same hard
drive, on your desk at home.”).
205. Rechtin, supra note 18, at 89.
206. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER
SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES at 1 (2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/
documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Eiectronic-Media-Compliant.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LCH9-3NCJ].
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search doctrine. 207 Moreover, requiring a showing of reasonable suspicion
would not impede “legitimate law enforcement objectives” because
reasonable suspicion is not a “high threshold” to meet. 208
F.

Imposition of an Even Higher Standard: Probable Cause
Required?

While reasonable suspicion is the most stringent standard ever
applied to searches at the border, 209 perhaps it is necessary to require a
showing of probable cause where forensic searches of electronic devices
are involved. Some commentators go further, suggesting the government
should be required to obtain a warrant before performing forensic
searches at the border. 210 Arguably, imposing this requirement for
searches of digital data would not interfere with the government’s national
security interests—border agents remain free to search for physical
contraband, such as weapons, that may pose an imminent danger. 211
Further, anything less than probable cause may fail to afford enough
protection to a traveler’s privacy; under the current state of the law,
international travelers “should not expect much” when it comes to their
digital devices. 212
VI. CONCLUSION
The border search exception is justified on the basis of the
government’s interest in national security, which has been recognized as

207. See Wright, supra note 165, at 728 (arguing that “the purpose of the border search
exception to the Fourth Amendment was to prevent the entry of physical contraband into the United
States” and that files contained on a computer should not fall into the same category as contraband
such as “firearms” and “controlled substances (drugs)” for the purpose of Fourth Amendment
protection).
208. Rankin, supra note 7, at 340–42.
209. United States v. Wanjiku, 919 F.3d 472, 481 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
210. See, e.g., Christopher I. Pryby, Note, Forensic Border Searches After Carpenter Require
Probable Cause and a Warrant, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 507, 509 (2019) (arguing the government should
be required to show both probable cause and obtain a warrant prior to forensically searching a
traveler’s electronic device).
211. Id. at 526.
212. See Jared Janes, The Border Search Doctrine in the Digital Age: Implications of Riley v.
California on Border Law Enforcement’s Authority for Warrantless Searches of Electronic Devices,
35 REV. LITIG. 71, 102–03 (2016) (arguing that it is more likely border agents will find “incriminating
evidence” when searching an electronic device as opposed to a suitcase, and without requiring border
agents to show probable cause before undertaking a search, the border search doctrine could be easily
exploited).
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greatest at the border. 213 However, travelers should not be required to
relinquish all constitutional rights simply by virtue of traveling
internationally, especially considering a traveler’s increased privacy
expectations that have come with modern technology. 214 The current
suspicionless standard inadvertently allows customs agents to search
devices for a variety of “bad reasons.” 215 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
will soon need to establish a uniform standard with respect to forensic
searches of electronic devices at the border. 216 Alternatively, Congress
could set an appropriate standard. 217
The uniquely intrusive nature of forensic searches makes it
inappropriate to classify them as “routine,” placing the search of an
electronic device in the same category as that of a suitcase or other
traditional container. 218 The constitutional protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment should not be forgotten solely because an individual
chooses to cross the border. 219 Where electronic data is the subject of a
search, there is “enormous potential for a violation of the owner’s
expectation of privacy.” 220 Accordingly, some degree of particularized
suspicion should be required before federal agents can perform forensic
searches despite the physical location at which the search occurs.
While the Supreme Court has not identified what, exactly, renders a
search “nonroutine,” 221 forensic searches should be placed into this
category, requiring border agents to possess individualized suspicion

213. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
214. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that while a
traveler may not feel his privacy has been violated if law enforcement searches his briefcase, he may
feel a greater intrusion where his laptop is searched “due to the vast amount of information potentially
available on electronic devices.”).
215. Ari B. Fontecchio, Suspicionless Laptop Searches Under the Border Search Doctrine: The
Fourth Amendment Exception That Swallows Your Laptop, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 231, 264–65 (2009)
(arguing that border officers should not conduct a search based solely on the officer’s “hunch” or
racial profiling, and searches should not be conducted for the purpose of “harassing a bothersome
traveler” and that a suspicionless standard “allows searches for all these bad reasons, compromising
efficiency and border security.”). The author recommends a “one good reason” standard, which would
prohibit border agents from conducting forensic searches of electronics at the border unless the officer
had “one good reason” for doing so, as this would ensure that the search was directed at detecting
“harmful data.” Id. at 256.
216. Eunice Park, The Elephant in the Room: What Is A “Nonroutine” Border Search, Anyway?
Digital Device Searches Post-Riley, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 312 (2017).
217. Bector, supra note 13, at 717.
218. Rachel Flipse, Comment, An Unbalanced Standard: Search & Seizure of Electronic Data
Under the Border Search Doctrine, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 851, 862 (2010).
219. Id. at 863.
220. Id.
221. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 144 (4th Cir. 2018).
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before forensically searching a traveler’s device. 222 As the Fourth Circuit
explained in Kolsuz, forensic searches should be categorized as
nonroutine based on the “sheer quantity of data” capable of being stored
on digital devices and the “uniquely sensitive nature” of the information
stored. 223 Forensic searches are significantly more intrusive than the
search of other types of property. 224
Further, electronic devices should be treated as distinct from mere
containers. 225 The storage capacity of traditional containers is far
exceeded by that of modern electronic devices, and one commentator
noted that “one hard drive may hold the paper equivalent of more than
twice the number of trees in Central Park.” 226 While the search of a
traditional “container” such as a suitcase has the potential to reveal
sensitive personal information, “it does not in the process transmit the
whole of a person’s life.” 227 While a suitcase and cell phone are both used
for storage, they have distinct functions in our modern world and should
be treated differently for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment—even at
the border.
As an alternative to the current suspicionless standard, forensic
searches at the border should require, at a minimum, a showing of
reasonable suspicion. 228 A reasonable suspicion standard is only a
“minimal requirement, just the next level up from no suspicion at all,” and
it is unlikely that imposition of such a standard would create any
substantial risk to national security. 229 Some commentators advocate for
an even a higher standard, arguing that a showing of probable cause is
necessary to prevent federal agents from bypassing Fourth Amendment
222. O’Grady, supra note 47, at 2260 (advancing the proposition that “all border searches of
electronic devices are therefore nonroutine and require some form of individualized suspicion.”).
223. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 144–45.
224. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he exposure of
confidential and personal information has permanence. It cannot be undone. Accordingly, the
uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic devices carries with it a significant expectation of
privacy and thus renders and exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with other forms of
property.”).
225. Leach, supra note 186, at 329 (arguing that electronic devices may present a “new category
of property” for the purpose of evaluating protection under the Fourth Amendment, as electronic
devices are different from “a closed container or a vehicle.”).
226. Maddalena DeSimone, Note, Can We Curate It? Why Luggage and Smartphones Merit
Different Treatment at the United States Border, 2019 Colum. BUS. L. REV. 696, 726 (2019).
227. Donohue, supra note 31, at 1010.
228. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (“Reasonable suspicion is a modest, workable standard that is
already applied in the extended border search, Terry stop, and other contexts. Its application to the
forensic examination here will not impede law enforcement’s ability to monitor and secure our
borders or to conduct appropriate searches of electronic devices.”).
229. O’Grady, supra note 47, at 2283.
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requirements by choosing to simply “wait for their suspect to arrive at the
border” to search her devices.230 Border agents should not be afforded
access to “a loophole to Fourth Amendment protections” for searches that
fail to further the recognized purpose of the border search exception:
national security. 231
If a traveler does not want to subject any items of personal property
to search, he can choose to leave those items at home rather than packing
them in his suitcase. The same cannot be said about electronic devices, 232
especially the modern cell phone, which arguably is not “optional” when
an individual chooses to travel internationally. 233 Thus, suspicionless
searches of digital information at the border may infringe upon on an
individual’s right to travel. 234 Whether reasonable suspicion or something
more, a consistent standard requiring some degree of suspicion for
forensic searches at the border must be instituted to protect the privacy
expectations of unsuspecting travelers and the security of our great nation.

230. Park, supra note 216, at 296. See also Bohannon, supra note 152, at 599 (“In other cases,
where an individual is suspected of a crime, the government has used the border search authority of
CBP to access information or records the agency would not otherwise have access to if they were
inside the country, even where the investigation is for a crime unrelated to the individual’s
international travel, customers laws, immigration, or terrorism.”).
231. Bohannon, supra note 152, at 599.
232. Because deleted information may be accessible during a search of an electronic device,
travelers are not able to “choose what they bring with them and what they leave at home” in the same
way they could choose what to place in their luggage. Samuel Townsend, Laptop Searches at the
Border and United States v. Cotterman, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1764 (2014).
233. Donohue, supra note 31, at 1004, 1007 (noting that most travelers that enter or exit the
country bring their devices “to satisfy a host of logistical and recreational needs” and often “need
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